DDASaccident008 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
9-24-1997
DDASaccident008
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident008" (1997). Global CWD Repository. 208.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/208
DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/01/2004 Accident number: 8 
Accident time: 10:30 Accident Date: 24/09/1997 
Where it occurred: Tewaran MA, Periska 
Village, Qaladiza 
District, Sulymania 
Province 
Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 25/09/1997 
ID original source: SB Name of source: MAG 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: electromagnetic 
Date record created: 11/01/2004 Date  last modified: 11/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
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Accident report 
The demining group was operating a three-man team with a two-man drill at the time of the 
accident. One man used the detector, marked any readings, and another man came forward 
to excavate the reading, feel for tripwires and cut any undergrowth. A third man at any one 
time was resting. 
An internal investigation was made available by the demining group. Its content is 
summarised below (see also Related papers). It stated that the ground at the site was hard, 
flat and had "medium metallic contamination". The area where the accident occurred had 
been cleared the previous day by two named deminers.  
At 10:30 the victim was walking through the area to reach the rest area when he stood on a 
mine, thought to be a PMN buried to a depth of about 5cm. The victim suffered a below knee 
amputation to his left leg and minor injuries to both arms and legs. 
The Schiebel detector used to search the area was checked and found to be in good order. 
An internal demining group investigation was carried out by two staff and dated 25th 
September 1997. It stated that work at the minefield had been in progress for about three 
weeks during which time several PMNs had been found. At the time of the accident the 
regular Team Supervisor was filling another position, the normal Team Leader had become 
"Acting Supervisor" and a Deminer Grade 1 was acting as Team Leader.  
The investigators carried out a quality control check at the site and found several large pieces 
of metal. The detector originally used to search the area was subjected to three one hour 
tests and found to be working normally. The decided from examining the crater that the mine 
had been buried no more than 5-8cm deep. 
One of the deminers responsible for clearing the accident area said that the supervisor did not 
carry out quality assurance checks that day or any other. He said that the metallic ore in the 
ground made the detector read constantly whenever the search head was in contact with the 
ground, so the deminers kept the head raised by 2-4cm. At the time they missed the mine, 
strong winds were making it difficult to hear the signals but they stopped when they could not 
hear at all. He thought they missed the mine because the wind was drowning out the signal 
and because they had rushed the clearance. He added that PMNs are easy to detect and that 
the rows of mines were easy to identify, so he did not think there were any mines in the area 
of the accident (no row of mines had been found). 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the team was not supervised effectively because of the 
inexperience of the Acting Supervisor and because the Acting Team Leader was too "familiar" 
with the deminers. They decided that the search was not carried out correctly because the 
detector head was being raised off the ground. Also that the Acting Supervisor failed to carry 
out quality control checks. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers should not be promoted to Team Leader 
without receiving full training. Also that QA checks should be carried out and that "severe 
disciplinary action" should be taken against the Acting Supervisor and the two deminers who 
"cleared" the area. 
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 18 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 20 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Arms 
minor Genitals 
minor Hand 
minor Legs 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
The Medic stated that the victim "lost his left leg, had not much bleeding and there was some 
wound in this leg…  Some wounds found on his right leg, such as under his right foot and 
some other wounds found on the same leg. His left hand had some slight wounds due to the 
pieces of stones and other thing and it was slightly burnt. His penis had some wounds and 
burns but fortunately his right testicle and penis head had only some wounds and burnings".  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field Control Inadequacy" because it seems 
that the deminers had been inadequately supervised and unauthorised "mine-hunting" in 
recognised rows had been allowed. The victim himself may have been working properly 
(according to the group's SOPs) but at least some of the demining group were not. 
If the detector was impossible to hear in the conditions of work, it was inadequate and other 
equipment should have been considered or work stopped. If the victim was being pressured 
to work quickly, that may represent a further failure of management.  
The failure to ensure that field supervisors were adequately trained represents a significant 
failure of senior management, so the secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.   
See “Related papers” for an investigation into mines found in areas believed to have been 
cleared.  
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Related papers 
A “final” report on this and a non-injurious missed-mine accident in the same area was made 
on 25th November 1998. The report follows, edited for anonymity. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING ACCIDENT AT TEWARAN 
MINEFIELD AND SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF MINES IN AN AREA THOUGHT 
TO BE CLEAR 
 
Aim of this report 
On assuming the role of STA I discovered there was a certain amount of ill feeling amongst 
the ex-pat Technical Advisors regarding 2 accidents which resulted from very low standard 
clearance drills in the minefield at Pereska village in Qaladiza district of Sulymania. 
I felt that the overall impression from the Technical Advisors was that the overall reporting and 
investigating of these accidents was not concluded. 
I therefore thought it necessary to compile the following report to clarify the overall picture, 
and to ensure that everyone understood the reasons certain decisions were taken and the 
steps that have been taken to address the problems highlighted by these 2 accidents. 
It must be remembered that this report is being written over 1 year after the first accident and 
II months after the second accident. 
 
Background 
Clearance began at Terawan minefield on 07Sept 1997. 
The demining teams deployed to carry out the task were from the Dyana operations base in 
Erbil Governorate. 
 
First accident 
On the 24 Sept 1997 a deminer stepped on a PMN AP blast mine in a cleared area, as a 
result of this he suffered a traumatic amputation of the lower left leg and injury to the right leg. 
As a result of this accident an investigation was carried out by the NSMS and submitted to the 
Senior Mines Specialist. The report was compiled and dated 25 Sept 1997. The Senior Mines 
Specialist added comments to the report in the form of conclusions and recommendations 
These recommendations were as follows: 
 
Immediate 
1. All demining operations to be suspended. 
2. 1 weeks 'refresher' training for all deminers, where SOPS are to be re-taught 
 
Intermediate 
1. A supervisors/Team leaders course is to be held involving all current supervisors 
and team leaders who have not yet attended the relevant course. 
2. Areas of Teweran minefield are to be re-cleared, these areas are to be identified 
by the NSMS. 
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3. The acting supervisor who was in charge of the minefield and the No 1+2 of the 
sub team who carried out the search of the area of the accident are to be dismissed for gross 
negligence. 
4. A report is to be prepared by the TMS reference the calibration of the Schiebel 
metal detector, and the cause of deminer complacency. 
 
The investigation found that the accident had occurred in an area where large fragments had 
been discovered by the NSMS and the TMS on their initial visit to the site, not only in the 
immediate vicinity of the accident site but throughout the minefield. 
Therefore the SMS instructed the NSMS to realign the start position for re-clearance back to 
the original position and to re-clear the area. 
In response to the accident, and following the conclusion that the deminers were lifting the 
head of the Schiebel off the ground to eliminate ground noise the SMS tasked me to carry out 
a test on the performance of the AN19/2 detector when working in 'highly contaminated' soil. 
The SMS was convinced that one of the major contributing factors to the original accident was 
that the deminers were ignoring signals which they interpreted to be from metal fragments 
and not mines, and were subsequently ignoring many contacts in the belief that they were 
only fragments 
The SMS explains his concerns in the monthly report for Sept 1997. 
I conducted the test with [another ex-pat TA] at Penjwin operations base on 29/30 Sept 1997. 
The report was submitted to the SMS on 0l October 1997. 
The SMS made certain changes to SOPs based on the recommendations from this report the 
changes and reasons for them are laid out clearly in the monthly report for Oct 1997, I was 
consulted by the SMS as were members of the senior national staff and all were happy' with 
the changes introduced. 
In response to the lack of formalised Quality Assurance reporting within N. lraq, the SMS 
devised a specific form to be used by all Technical Advisors when visiting demining tasks. 
This form was designed to be filled in on the site and signed by the senior technical person on 
site as well as the site supervisor, a copy would be attached to the TA weekly report for 
submission to the SMS. The form was also translated into Kurdish so that supervisors could 
carry out QA and then submit weekly reports to the DDFM. 
 
Second accident 
During preparation for the winter close down period of 1997, a mine was discovered on the 
other side of the minefield in an area thought to have been cleared. This mine was found after 
the demarcation had been moved forward from the original position to the edge of the cleared 
area. 
This accident happened at a time when [ex-pat TA] was still under probation and the SMS 
was on Christmas leave. The acting SMS was [name excised]. 
The Technical Advisor present when the mine was found was [name excised], after informing 
[the acting SMS], he started to carry out an investigation into the circumstances regarding the 
mine found and the standard of clearance in the minefield. He found that the overall standard 
of clearance was extremely low in the area where the mine was found, and re-demarcated the 
area to include the entire area which had thought to have been cleared. 
In the monthly demining report for Dec 1 997, [the acting SMS] reported that the mine had 
been found. 
The investigation which had been started identified large amounts of fragmentation in the 
'cleared' area The Programme Director at the time [name excised] contacted the Technical 
Operations Manager [name excised] in the [head] office for guidance and was instructed to 
suspend the investigation and await the return of the SMS from leave. 
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Follow up Action 
On his return from leave the SMS was briefed about the accident by [the two ex-pats]. 
In the monthly report for January 1998 the SMS expressed concern regarding the accident 
and the necessity to re-clear the area shown on the sketch map attached to the January 1998 
report. I have attached a copy of this sketch map to this report. He also said he would look 
further into this accident and the previous accident which resulted in the injury to [name 
excised]. He was concerned that these accidents had raised some doubts about the 
performance of some of the senior supervisory staff involved in the whole story of Tewaran 
minefield. In the January report the SMS wrote that he would conclude the investigation and 
submit the report to UK. 
In the monthly report for February 1998 the SMS reported that 'following further investigation 
into the accident there is to be no further disciplinary action taken against any member of 
staff'. 
The report also states that the investigation report is now complete and has been forwarded 
to the UK. To date I can find no specific separate report on this accident, therefore I assume 
that the SMS was referring to the original Investigation report compiled after the accident in 
Sept 1997. 
During the period of these 2 accidents I was carrying out the duties of the Technical Training 
Advisor, at the time of the accident I visited the scene with the NSMS to point him in the right 
direction regarding accident investigation. However as I was the only Technical Advisor in 
Sulymania at that time I had to leave the next morning to monitor the other teams in the 
governorate. 
When the second accident occurred 1 was on holiday and on my return in Jan 1998,1 had to 
immediately commence the Winter training programme in Dyana operations base. This period 
carried on at Qaladiza until the restart of operations in early March 1998. 
Although I did not have a chance to visit the site of the second accident, I did have the 
situation described to me by [ex-pat TA] and the SMS. 
I discussed the situation at Tewaran minefield on numerous occasions with the SMS and 
agreed with his decisions to re-clear the areas and that emphasis should be placed on 
improving a more disciplined approach to Quality Assurance. 
The training period carried out in early 1998 was designed to improve the skills of the current 
team leaders and supervisors, and to carry out an assessment of their capability to carry out 
their duties and responsibilities. 
In the monthly report for Jan 1998, the SMS expresses his concern over these 2 accidents 
occurring in the same area in short succession, and points out that the areas which had 
thought to have been cleared by the demining teams had in fact been subjected to a very 
poor clearance standard, and that when the clearance had been carried out, the resident ex-
pat TA was actually on leave, this was at a time when there was insufficient TAs to cover all 
areas fully. 
The task had been supervised by the national staff only, and the SMS saw this poor standard 
as an indication of how standards will fall if there is no ex-pat TA presence in country. 
The SMS instructed the TA for Qaladiza to red ear the area outlined in the attached sketch 
map on the resumption of operations in March 1998. 
The SMS left the programme in March 1998 and I assumed the duties and responsibilities of 
the STA. 
In March 1998 [a new TA] joined the programme as the new Technical Training Advisor. l 
tasked him to set up a new minefield clearance recording system and to look at improvements 
that could be made in Quality Assurance. He undertook this task enthusiastically and the 
improvements made in these areas have gone a long way in making [the] programme more 
professional. Unfortunately [the new TA] had to leave the programme shortly after his arrival. 
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Conclusions 
1 After the accident the clearance teams were concentrated on the upper portion of the 
minefield where the accident had occurred. Prior to the accident the team had been split 
between the upper and lower parts of the minefield. Therefore the lower part of the minefield 
was initially not identified for re-clearance or if it was this was not recorded. 
2.The second accident actually came about when a deminer asked for the area on the lower 
side of the minefield to be quality checked after the demarcation had been moved. When 
questioned why he wanted this area re-checked, he said it was because the sub team 
involved in the accident had also worked in this area. 
3.There appears to have been some confusion over the areas to be re-cleared following the 
accident and the areas to be considered as still clear. I believe this is largely due to the poor 
system of minefield clearance recording in operation at the time, the initial investigation report 
should have also included a sketch map clearly indicating the areas to be re-cleared. 
4.The immediate response to the accident and subsequent action has addressed most of the 
problems associated with these 2 accidents. However the investigation report was lacking an 
accurate recording of the re-clearance required, therefore the fact that the lower area was 
suspect was not recorded. 
5.These accidents highlighted the importance of accurate recording and record keeping of 
minefield clearance, and the requirement of high standards of quality QA procedures. 
6.The disciplinary action taken against the deminers who were dismissed becomes 
questionable as it would appear from the subsequent re-clearance of the area that they were 
not the only ones carrying out low standards of clearance. Therefore the performance of the 
team as a whole could have been subject to disciplinary action. 
7.The lack of a written conclusion to the discovery of the mine in the second accident, led to 
confusion and suspicion amongst the Technical Advisors. 
 
Recommendations 
I firmly believe that lessons have been learnt from these 2 accidents and that the current QA 
procedures minefield recording systems and training have lowered the chances of a repeat of 
such accidents happening again. However the following recommendations should be applied. 
1 No members of the national staff should be tasked to carry out 'accident reporting' until 
formalised training has been undertaken, this should include a practical exercise. 
2.All accident investigation reports are to include a copy of the minefield working map 
showing all areas clearly marked. This map is to include areas cleared and if necessary areas 
to be re-cleared. 
3.The accident report is to list all Quality Assurance checks carried out by date, and with the 
name of the person who carried it out. 
4.As these accidents both happened over l year ago this report should be seen as the final 
conclusion. 
5.In relationship to the question of the disciplinary procedure to be applied in these areas, I 
believe that further guidance from UK should be sought. I believe that the Technical 
Operations Manager should examine the disciplinary process in such cases to ensure that the 
procedure is uniform throughout [the Demining group.] 
Statements 
The following statements are reproduced as presented (edited for anonymity). The English is 
sometimes confusing. 
 
Deminer No.2  [Victim’s partner] 
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While we were working in Tewaran minefield on 24/09/97 at 10:30 a mine exploded and when 
I went to the accident site I found that the mine was left, so if it was due to an offence or due 
to a wire cut of the Schiebel when one of us working and the mine was left resulting in the 
accident. 
At the accident time, when changing at 10:30 1 was standing by the metal markers, calling at 
[the Victim]. He came to give me the (ballistic jacket and tile helmet), about 7m and the mine 
exploded, I didn’t see anything because of the dust and smoke. I changed my place one step 
to the left, finding [the Victim] fell down and shouted it is an accident. 
I went to him finding his leg cut, after bringing the stretcher we brought him outside. After that 
I went  to the accident site of the MF, finding that the place was of last week [the Victim 
himself and two others] were working in. 
 
Q. Did the supervisor carry out a quality assurance check the day prior to the 
accident 
A. No 
 
Q. When did the supervisor last carry out quality assurance checks 
A. Never 
 
Q. Are you familiar with the exact site of the accident. 
A. Yes 
 
Q. Was the area where the accident happened within your sub teams area of 
responsibility. 
A. Yes 
 
Q. Did you have any difficulty in locating the previously found mines in the minefield. 
A. No problem 
 
Q. Did you have any difficulties while carrying out clearance inside the minefield. 
A. Yes, there was a strong wind which some times made it difficult to hear the noise 
of the detector signal 
 
Q. Did you inform the supervisor of this problem. 
A. No 
 
Q. Did you stop working during the strong winds. 
A. We stopped working during the time of a gust of wind and then carried on. 
 
Q. Was the metal contamination causing any problems to the clearance. 
A. Yes, the metallic ore in the ground caused the detector to give out a constant 
reading when the search head was in contact with the ground. 
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Q. What action did you take to counter act the constant signal being given from the 
ground. 
A. We raised the search head off the ground until there was no sound. 
 
Q. At what height off the ground was the search head when the signal was not 
heard. 
A. 34cm 
 
Q. Had you ever had any problems with the detector that you used to clear the area 
of the accident. 
A. We had one problem about 1 week before the accident while I was working the 
detector stopped working, I realised that it was a fault with the batteries and stopped working 
to check the battery compartment, where I saw that one of the spring battery terminals was 
depressed therefore there was no contact so I pulled the spring out a little to make the contact 
better and then carried on working. 
 
Q. What do you think the reason is for missing the PMN mine. 
A. 1) Because we were rushing the clearance 
            2) Maybe because the wind drowned out the noise of the signal 
 
Q. What do you mean when you say you were rushing the clearance. 
A. We were sweeping the ground quickly with the search head, because the PMN 
mine is easy to detect, and also the rows of the mines were easy to identify so we did not 
think there was any mines in the area of the accident. 
 
Q. Had you ever been told to stop working by the no2 or supervisor for not carrying 
out the correct drills or procedures while working in Tewaran minefield. 
A. No 
 
Signed: 
 
Team Leader (acting supervisor) 
On 23.9 this area was cleared by both deminers [names excised] but due to the leaving of 
PMN mine under earth in depth of 20-25 cm. led to the leg cut of deminer [the Victim], this is 
due to either the mine detector didn't detect it or it was detected but left by them. 
To be informed on 23.9 due to the absence of deminer [name excised], they were working as 
a sub-team of 2 members in which [the third member. Name excised] was not there. 
Note: Many times we face problems of fastening in work due to that [two names excised] 
informed the team if finishing this MF (Tewaran), they'll be returned to Dyana. That was one 
of the motives behind the accident. 
 
Q. How long had you been acting supervisor. 
A. One month 
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Q. Had you received any training or briefing reference the duties and responsibilities 
of a supervisor. 
A. No 
 
Q. When supervising the team how do you cover the whole team. 
A. I split the team into two halves, l watch one half and the team leader watches the 
other half 
 
Q. When halving the team did you supervise the same half of the team everyday. 
A. Yes, but I use my binoculars to check the other half two or three times a day. 
 
Q. The day prior to the accident did you carry out quality assurance checks. 
A. No, as I was too busy carrying out the demolitions. 
 
When do you carryout quality assurance checks. 
A. At the end of the day. 
 
Q. How much area do you check. 
A. One sub team per day. 
 
Q. Did you carryout quality control checks on the half of the team which you were 
not supervising. 
A. No, the team leader carries out the checks. 
 
Q. Do you think that the clearance rate of the minefield was high. 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Why 
A. Because it was there was low metal contamination, and because some of the 
sub teams had heard a rumour that when they finish Taweran minefield they would be posted 
back to Dyana operations base. 
 
Q. Do you think that while clearance rate was so high that the deminers could have 
been carrying out the correct clearance drills. 
A. They carried out their drills correctly, except for their use of the Schiebel. 
 
Q. In what way were the team not using the Schiebel correctly. 
A. The search head of the detector was raised off the ground 34 cm 
 
Q. How deeply buried were the mines which the team were finding. 
A. Approximately 5cm 
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 Q. Had the detector which was used to search the area of the accident broken down 
while working on Tewaran minefield. 
A. No 
 
Q. Why do you think the sub team did not detect the mine. 
A. Probably because they did not use the Schiebel correctly, and were not paying 
enough care and attention to what they were doing. 
 
Deminer [No.3 in sub-team] 
We were ([the Victim] and me) when entering the MF at 10:30, [the Victim] went out, during 
changing he became about 7 m. away from me, hearing a sound and finding [the Victim] 
fallen down, I directly ran towards him and calling [name excised] whom he stopped work, the 
place was cleared, the day before I was there with [name excised], working there on 23.9, it 
was not my place. I was working in another team. 
[The Victim] lost his left leg. 
After stopping work for 20 min. the medic was doing the necessary first aid for him, then he 
was referred to Qaladiza hospital and from there to Sul. 
Since we were working in Tewaran MF, I don't doubt my work, the accident happened last 
week but I was working with down sub-team since the 22nd of the month. On 23rd l with 
[name excised] came to the place, working the next day, that is on 24.9, I, [the Victim and 
another] working there till the time of the accident happened. 
I haven’t known how that mine was left, is it due to haste or due to wire-cut of Schiebel or due 
to storm... 
 
Q. Did the supervisor carryout quality assurance checks the day prior to the 
accident. 
A. No 
 
Q. Did the supervisor ever carryout quality assurance checks. 
A. No 
 
Q. Are you familiar with the exact location of the accident. 
A. Yes 
 
Q. Was the area of the accident within the area of responsibility of your sub team. 
A. Yes 
 
Q. Did you have any difficulty in detecting the previously found mines. 
A. No 
 
Q. Did you have any other difficulties when carrying out clearance. 
A. Yes there was lots of bullet cases, and old food cans. 
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Q. How did this cause difficulties. 
A. Because the above items have high metal content the detector gave off a large 
signal, which we thought was a mine. So when we dug down we found that it was not a mine 
but only a piece of metal, and this affected our morale. 
 
Q. How did this affect your morale. 
A. Because the PMN is an unstable mine and easily functioned, when we thought 
the reading was not a mine we would excavate the ground quickly only to find a PMN, and 
this made us realise that we could have been injured. There was also some deeply buried 
cans which took up to 1 hour to uncover and in hot weather this affected the morale. 
 
Q. How deeply buried were the mines you had located during other days clearance. 
A. The deepest was approximately 10cm. 
 
Q. How long had you been working with the detector which you used the day prior 
to the accident. 
A. About three weeks 
 
Q. Had you any problems with the detector during that time. 
A. None 
 
Q. When sweeping the ground with the detector how far off the ground do you raise 
the search head. 
A. 2cm 
 
Q. If you receive a constant signal from the ground at 2cm what do you do.  
A .   Raise the search head until the noise disappears 
 
Q. What is the maximum height that you would raise the search head off the 
ground. 
A. I don’t know exactly in centimetres but I continued to raise the search head until 
the signal disappeared. 
 
Q. Have you or [your partner] ever been warned about incorrect clearance drills. 
A. I have never been warned, but [my partner] had been warned many times for 
working too quickly by myself, the team leader and supervisor. 
 
Signed 
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